Some say it's a copy of the F-22, others say its stealth is too poor to be considered a fourth-generation fighter. But you might not know that this Russian fighter jet with its pixelated camouflage hides a tumultuous industrial history. January 29, 2010, Komsomolsk-on-Amur. A uniquely shaped fighter jet broke through the freezing cold and completed its maiden flight. The Russians had waited almost twenty years for this day. The Americans' F-22 had long been in service, and the F-35 was accelerating its test flights. Russia, however, had only just sent this prototype, called the T-50, into the air. Later, it was renamed the Su-57. But even today, the controversy surrounding this fighter jet has never ceased. A Soviet legacy, the story of two solitary prototypes begins in the 1980s. At that time, the United States was developing "Advanced Tactical Fighter Jets," and the Soviet Union wasn't idle either. They launched a program called PAK FA, aiming to create their own next-generation fighter jet. The two main products were the MiG-1.44, featuring a canard configuration and twin vertical tails, and the Su-47 "Berkut," employing a very advanced forward-swept wing. What was the result for both the MiG-1.44 and the Su-47? Only one prototype of each was ever built. It wasn't that they didn't want to build them; each had its own flaws and simply didn't meet the standards of a fifth-generation fighter. The collapse of the Soviet Union only exacerbated the situation. While the F-22 was already in mass production, Russia could only watch helplessly. A turning point came in 2000 when India approached them. One country lacked funds but possessed the technology; the other had funds but lacked the technology. They quickly reached an agreement to jointly develop a fifth-generation fighter. In 2001, Russia officially restarted the project. Sukhoi won against Mikoyan, relying on its manufacturing strength. There were two competing proposals at the time. Mikoyan offered the E-721, emphasizing its low cost and ease of production. Sukhoi offered the T-50, boasting superior performance and advanced technology. Ultimately, Sukhoi won. Why? Ultimately, it all comes down to the strength of the manufacturing industry. The Su-27 series was exported in huge numbers, with far more derivative models than the MiG-29. More sales meant more profit, and more profit meant money for R&D, building a team, and accumulating experience. This is the simplest logic of manufacturing: production volume leads to accumulation, and accumulation leads to breakthroughs. Years later, the T-50 was renamed the Su-57. But the name change brought its share of problems. The inability to fit the engine revealed a major issue: one of the Su-57's biggest flaws was its exposed engine nozzle. Anyone with expertise could see this was a fatal flaw for stealth. Why this design? Not because they didn't want to hide it, but because they couldn't. The Su-57's original engine couldn't be found, so they had to use the same AL-41F1 (also called Product 117) as the Su-35. This engine itself wasn't bad, but it was too large. When the project was initially initiated, this size wasn't considered, resulting in repeated adaptations and modifications, ultimately leaving the nozzle exposed. This reflects a long-standing problem in Russian manufacturing: a fragmented supply chain. Engines and airframes are two separate systems, and their synergy severely declined after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A good component can't fit another good component in, ultimately compromising the overall performance. The good news is that, according to Russian media reports, newly delivered Su-57s will begin to be equipped with the AL-51F1 engine at the end of 2023. This new engine uses a serrated nozzle similar to the F-35, enabling supersonic cruise without afterburner, and significantly reducing radar and infrared signatures. But the question remains: can production capacity keep up? And how effective is its stealth capability? Many say the Su-57's stealth is poor, at best a fourth-generation-plus. This has some merit, but it's not comprehensive. First, its weaknesses: exposed engine nozzles, uneven fuselage, exposed screws, and a straight-through air intake… these do indeed affect stealth. Compared to the F-22's all-around stealth, the Su-57 is a level below. But it depends on what it's compared to. Russian patent documents show that the Su-57's radar cross-section is between 0.1 and 1 square meter, only one-thirtieth of the Su-27's. Some netizens used 3D modeling simulations (ignoring radar-absorbing materials) and found that the Su-57's radar cross-section within a 120-degree radius is approximately 0.48 square meters, while the F-35's is 0.06 square meters under the same conditions. If radar-absorbing materials are included, the actual value would be significantly lower. Modern radar has limited detection capabilities for targets smaller than 1 square meter, so the Su-57 can still be considered a stealth aircraft. Another interesting detail: pixel camouflage. The Su-57's unique paint scheme is not just for aesthetics. This pixelated style blurs the fuselage boundaries during high-speed flight, allowing the aircraft to blend better into the sky. This is a form of "visual stealth" to compensate for insufficient radar stealth, quite characteristic of Russia. The Russian logic: maneuverability first. Why didn't the Su-57 follow the F-22's example and maximize stealth? It's not a matter of technological inadequacy, but a different approach. The Russians' understanding of fifth-generation fighters is that stealth should give way to maneuverability. If a sniper can kill an enemy from a kilometer away with a single shot, shouldn't they also be equipped with a pistol and practice bayonet fighting? In their words, the F-22 lacks ground attack capabilities, and the F-35's performance is too inferior, so they simply combine the advantages of both. One saying is quite direct: 57 = 22 + 35. Structurally, the Su-57 clearly follows the wide-spaced twin-engine layout inherited from the Su-27. This design offers good maneuverability, but the uneven fuselage affects stealth. The outward-canted twin vertical tails are positioned forward, and the entire vertical tail is a movable control surface-this is more like the F-22's rival, the YF-23. In short, the Su-57 did not sacrifice aerodynamic performance for stealth. High-altitude, high-speed, and super-maneuverability-these old traditions of Soviet aircraft are retained. The avionics have finally departed from the "clock shop" style cockpit of previous Soviet fighters, which was jokingly called a "clock shop"-full of analog instruments. The Su-57 has finally turned its fortunes around. The cockpit features two 38cm multi-function LCD screens and a wide-angle HUD. Pilots are equipped with helmet-mounted displays that use pupil tracking to improve situational awareness. The radar system, called N036 "Squirrel," consists of five sub-radars: a main radar in the nose, side radars on both sides of the nose, and L-band radars on the wings. This system, in conjunction with two onboard computers, can detect targets 400 kilometers away, simultaneously track 30 targets, and engage 8 of them. It can be said that the Su-57 incorporates Russia's most advanced electronic and information technologies, making it the most intelligent aircraft they can build. India was lured in with promises, but ultimately chose to leave. Russia had promised India a very lucrative deal: dozens of improvements based on India's requirements, production licenses, a two-seat production line in India, and even export opportunities. India was very interested and proposed a $30 billion investment plan. After its maiden flight in 2010, both sides envisioned producing 1,000 aircraft over the next 40 years-200 each for domestic use and 600 for export. But reality is harsh. In 2011, cracks appeared in the fuselage of two prototypes after a flight demonstration under 5G restrictions. Structural strength and material lifespan-the most fundamental issues in manufacturing-were repeatedly exposed. The first phase of testing wasn't even fully completed until 2014. Russia realized it couldn't even handle a single-seat version, let alone a two-seat one. In 2018, India withdrew in disappointment and decided to develop its own AMCA. However, later reports suggested India might still want to buy 40 Su-57s as a "transitional" measure. To date, only a few dozen Su-57s have been produced. The F-35 has exceeded a thousand, and even the J-20, which had a later maiden flight, has at least 350. This gap can no longer be explained by technology alone.
